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A New Measure of Competition in Indian Loan Market 
 
                                                                             Abstract 
 
This study endeavours at measuring bank competition in Indian loan market using a 
new competitiveness index, the Augmented Relative Profit Difference (ARPD), which 
quantifies the impact of marginal costs on performance, measured in terms of market 
shares.  This study yields two major insights. First, the theoretical foundation of the 
ARPD is very robust as compared to other conventional measures. Second, applying 
this unbiased competition indicator to Indian bank loan markets shows that financial 
reform indeed has contributed to significant improvements in competition. As regards, 
the competition among specific types of banks, we found public sector banks and 
private sector banks are comparatively more competitive than foreign banks. The 
empirical finding indicates that the Indian loan market is monopolistic in nature.  
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1.   Introduction 
It is well known that Indian financial system is predominantly a bank-based 
financial system. The banking sector plays an important role in mobilization of deposits 
from the saving households and allocation of credit to productive sectors, apart from 
financing the Government through investment in treasury securities. Until the early 
1990s, commercial banks under the aegis public sector performed all these functions in a 
highly regulated environment guided by social banking for economic development 
objective and fiscal policy dominated macro policy objectives. In such an environment, 
banks could not emphasize on competitiveness and viability of their business with 
regard to asset quality and profitability. In the wake of balance of payment crisis, India 
adopted reform with a view to alleviate structural impediments to higher economic 
growth through a competitive and open economy model. At this juncture it was 
realized that economic reform cannot take place meaningfully without a revamp of 
financial system. Thus, the reform of banking sector was pursued based on the 
recommendation of a high level committee. The reform of banking sector emphasized 
on promoting a diversified, efficient and competitive financial system with the ultimate 
goal of improving the allocative efficiency of resources through operational flexibility, 
improved financial viability and institutional strengthening.  
In this pursuit, the banking sector reform encompassed various dimensions. 
Firstly, the level of competition was gradually increased within the banking system by 
allowing greater participation of domestic private and foreign banks while allowing 
banks greater freedom in pricing and allocation of credit. Secondly, measures were 
taken to develop various segments of financial markets such as money, bond, credit, 
foreign exchange and equity segments, with the introduction of newer instruments with 
a view to allow banks and financial institutions and also savers and investors 
opportunities for diversification, optimization of return and risk on their portfolios and 
effective management of liquidity and other risks. Thirdly, in order to ensure stability of 
the financial system, banks were subjected to international best practices in prudential 
regulation and supervision tailored to Indian requirements. The supervisory system 
was revamped under the ambit of the Board for Financial Supervision in view of the 
crucial role of supervision in the creation of an efficient banking system. Fourthly, 
measures were taken to improve the institutional arrangements including the legal 
framework and technology platform for effective, cost efficient and sound payment and 
settlement system.  
Finally, in order to be consistent with the new institutional architecture for the 
financial system in general and the banking sector in particular, the monetary policy 
framework made a phased shift from direct instruments of monetary management such 
as cash reserve and statutory liquidity requirements to an increasing reliance on 
indirect instruments such as short term policy interest rate including repo and reverse 
repo rates. Thus, there was a shift from traditional quantum of money to interest rate 
channel of monetary transmission mechanism. This shift in policy framework envisaged 
that in an increasingly competitive and integrated financial market environment, banks 
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will be guided by market conditions and their balance sheet pressures along with 
regulatory and prudential requirements while pricing their assets and liability 
components, which in turn would have consequential effect on credit to private sector 
and the real economy.      
A banking system that exhibits some degree of market power, however, may 
improve credit availability to certain banks, and it may provide incentives for banks to 
screen loans, which aids efficient allocation of resources. Market power in a banking 
system may contribute to stability by providing incentives that mitigate risk-taking 
behaviour, and by providing incentives to screen and monitor loans, which can 
improve the quality of banks’ portfolios. Policies such as capital requirements, 
disclosure rules, and risk-based deposit insurance, however, may provide incentives for 
banks to behave prudently even in a competitive market.  
A new approach to measure competition introduced and applied by Boone (2000, 
2004, 2008). The so-called Boone indicator measures (RPD-Relative Profit Difference) the 
impact of efficiency on performance in terms of profits or market shares. The idea 
behind the Boone indicator is that competition enhances the performance of efficient 
banks and impairs the performance of inefficient banks, which is reflected in their 
respective profits or market shares. This approach is related to the well-known 
efficiency hypothesis, which also explains banks’ performances by differences in 
efficiency (Goldberg and Rai, 1996; Smirlock, 1985). This method allows measurement 
of competition not only for the entire banking market, but also for separate product 
markets, such as the loan market, and for single types of banks, such as commercial and 
cooperative banks. In this study we have used this measure to evaluate competition in 
the Indian banking sector. 
Generally, the policymakers aim to facilitate a banking system that supports 
economic efficiency and stability and they want to check whether the policy change had 
the desired effect. To illustrate, a competition authority may want to monitor an 
industry so that it can intervene when competition slackens by a policy change with the 
goal of intensifying competition in the industry. Competition in the financial sector 
matters for a number of reasons viz., for the efficiency of the production of financial 
services, the quality of financial products, and the degree of innovation in the sector. It 
has been shown, theoretically as well as empirically, that the degree of competition in 
the financial sector can matter for the access of firms and households to financial 
services and external financing, in turn affecting overall economic growth, although not 
all relationships are clear. The long-existing theory of industrial organization has shown 
that the competitiveness of an industry cannot be measured by market structure 
indicators alone, such as number of institutions, or Herfindahl and other concentration 
indexes (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1982). The threat of entry can be a more important 
determinant of the behavior of market participants (Besanko and Thakor 1992). Theory 
also suggests that performance measures, such as the size of the banking margins or 
profitability, do not necessarily indicate the competitiveness of a banking system. These 
measures are influenced by a number of factors, such as a country's macro performance 
and stability, the form and degree of taxation of financial intermediation, the quality of 
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the country's information and judicial systems, and bank-specific factors, such as scale 
of operations and risk preferences. As such, these measures can be poor indicators of 
the degree of competition.  
In the following, the paper is presented in five sections. Section 2 reviews the 
literature. Section 3 discusses theoretical perspectives methodology and data followed 
by stylized facts in Section 4, and empirical analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.   Review of Literature 
The evidence of measuring the level of competition in Indian banking systems is 
scarce. There have been a few studies, to our knowledge, that have investigated the 
degree of competition in Indian financial industries. Prasad, A. and Ghosh, S. (2005) 
estimated the Panzar and Rosse  (1987) H-statistic of Indian banks for the period of 1996 
to 2004. They found that the Indian banking sector was in monopolistic competition 
equilibrium. Bhanu Murthy and Deb (2008) used Bodenhorn’s Measure of Mobility to 
measure the competition in Indian private sector banks for the period of 1992-2002. 
They found the market structure of private banking sector monopolistic in nature. 
Rather, testing for the degree of effective competition requires a structural, 
contestability approach, along the lines pursued in much of the industrial organization 
literature. As in other sectors, the degree of competition in the banking system should 
be measured with respect to the actual behavior of (marginal) bank conduct. The actual 
behavior should be related not only to banking market structure but also to entry 
barriers, including barriers on foreign ownership, and the severity of activity 
restrictions since those can limit the degree of intra-industry competition. Furthermore, 
the degree of competition from other forms of financial intermediation (capital markets, 
nonbank financial institutions, insurance companies) will play a role in determining 
banking system competitiveness. 
 
As a first-order effect, one would expect increased competition in the financial 
sector to lead to lower costs and enhanced efficiency, even allowing for the fact that 
financial products are heterogeneous. Recent research has illustrated, however, that the 
relationships between competition and banking system performance, access to 
financing, stability, and growth are more complex. Market power in banking, for 
example, may be to a degree beneficial for access to financing (Petersen and Rajan 1995). 
The view that competition is unambiguously good in banking is more naive than in 
other industries, and vigorous rivalry may not be the first best for financial sector 
performance. This literature has also shown that technological progress lowering 
production or distribution costs for financial services providers does not necessarily 
lead to more or better access to finance.  
 
A number of papers have investigated the competitive condition in banking 
systems. In one of the first papers, Berger and Hannan (1989) investigate the commonly 
observed relationship between market concentration and profitability using data for 
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U.S. banks from 1983-85. They try to separate the effects of noncompetitive price 
behavior from that of greater efficiency for firms with larger market shares and find that 
noncompetitive price behavior could explain the relationship. While many of the 
studies are not formal structure-performance-conduct tests, their results have been 
interpreted as being indicative of the degree of competition and/or its causes and 
consequences in the financial sector (Berger 1995). A number of recent studies have 
investigated the effects of regulations and specific structural or other factors presumed 
to relate to the competitive environment on banking performance. Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2004) document, among others, that tighter entry requirements are negatively 
linked with bank efficiency, leading to higher interest rate margins and overhead 
expenditures, while restricting foreign bank participation tends to increase bank 
fragility. These results are consistent with the view that tighter entry restrictions tend to 
limit competition and emphasize that it is not the actual level of foreign presence or 
bank concentration but the contestability of a market that determines bank efficiency 
and stability.  
A number of papers have applied either the Bresnahan(1982) or the Panzar and 
Rosse(1987) methodology to the issue of competition in the financial sector, although 
mostly to the banking system specifically.  Cetorelli (2004) provides more detail on 
these formal tests and reviews results of previous studies of empirical banking studies. 
One of the first applications of the Bresnahan test is that of Shaffer (1989). For a sample 
of U.S. banks, he finds results that strongly reject collusive conduct but are consistent 
with perfect competition. Using the same model, Shaffer (1993) finds that the Canadian 
banking system was competitive over the period 1965-89 despite being relatively 
concentrated. Gruben and McComb (2003) find that the Mexican banking system before 
1995 was more competitive, that is, marginal prices were set below marginal costs. 
Shaffer (2001) uses the Bresnahan(1982) model for 15 countries in North America, 
Europe, and Asia during 1979-91. He finds significant market power in five markets 
and excess capacity in one market. Estimates were consistent with either contestability 
or Cournot type oligopoly in most of these countries, while five countries were 
significantly more competitive than Cournot behavior would imply.  
Shaffer (1982) applied the PR model to a sample of New York banks using data 
for 1979 and found monopolistic competition. Nathan and Neave (1989) studied 
Canadian banks using the PR methodology and found results consistent with the 
results of Shaffer (1989) using the Bresnahan methodology, i.e., a rejection of monopoly 
power. Several studies have applied the PR methodology to European banking systems. 
Generally, the studies reject both perfect collusion as well as perfect competition and 
find mostly evidence of monopolistic competition (Bikker and Haaf, 2001). Some studies 
find differences between types of banks. For example, De Bandt and Davis (2000) find 
monopoly behavior for small banks in France and Germany while they find 
monopolistic competition for small banks in Italy and for the large banks in all three 
countries in their sample. This suggests that in these countries small banks have more 
market power perhaps as they cater more to local markets. The price cost margin (PCM) 
is widely used as a measure of competition. However, the theoretical foundations of 
6 
 
PCM as a competition measure are not robust. Theoretical papers like Amir (2002), 
Bulow and Klemperer (1999), Rosentahl (1980) and Stiglitz (1989) present models where 
more intense competition leads to higher PCM instead of lower margins. 
Boone (2008) assumes that more efficient firms (that is, firms with lower 
marginal costs) will gain higher market shares or profits, and that this effect will be 
stronger the heavier competition in that market is. In order to support this intuitive 
market characteristic, Boone develops a broad set of theoretical models (Boone, 2000, 
2001 and 2008, Boone et al., 2004) found to be more robust than any other methods, viz. 
PCM, HHI, H-statistic. Both competition and market power, however, can have positive 
implications for efficiency, and prudent regulation. It may be optimal to facilitate an 
environment that promotes competitive behavior (contestability), thereby minimizing 
the potential costs of market power while realizing benefits associated with any 
residual market power.  
By contrast, structural variables do not have a significant impact on competition, 
as measured by the H-statistic. Contestability appears to be more important than 
market structure in explaining the strength of competition in banking. In general three 
approaches have been used to measure competition in the banking sector. The fourth 
one called Augmented Relative Profit Difference (ARPD) method is proposed in this 
study and is used to measure competition in Indian Banking sector using panel data.  
 
2.1  Structural measures of competition  
 
Familiar measures of market structure, such as concentration ratios, the number 
of banks and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), are still widely used in empirical 
work. These measures originated in the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm 
linking the structure of a market to influences on bank behaviour and thus sector 
performance. One prediction of the SCP approach is that higher concentration would 
encourage collusion and reduce efficiency. The SCP paradigm has well-known 
weaknesses. Structure may not be exogenous, but instead it might be the result of 
banks’ behaviour. A more concentrated market structure could be the result of better, 
more efficient performance, contrary to the predictions of the SCP paradigm. There is 
no consensus on the best variable for measuring market structure in banking, while 
performance is typically measured with variables, such as net interest margins or 
profitability, which can be influenced by factors other than the degree of competition, 
such as a country‘s macroeconomic situation or the level of taxation.  
 
2.2  Measures of market contestability  
 
The second approach assesses competitive conditions in terms of contestability. 
The price cost margin (PCM) is widely used as a measure of competition. It is believed 
that there are two reasons why PCM is still such a popular empirical measure of 
competition. First, as long as there is no evidence that the theoretical counterexamples 
are important empirically, one would expect that PCM remains a popular competition 
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measure. The second reason for the popularity of PCM is that the data needed to get a 
reasonable estimate of PCM are available in most datasets. A concentrated banking 
sector can remain competitive if it is contestable, that is if entry and exit into the system 
is easy and if bank regulations and supervision promote a level-playing field across all 
banks. Variables like regulatory indicators of entry requirements, the presence of 
foreign ownership, formal and informal entry barriers and activity restrictions measure 
the threat of entry in the sector and thus its contestability through the degree of entry 
and exit. Indeed, the standard approach used by the literature to retrieve the PCM 
specifies a demand function and the derivation of its first-order equilibrium condition, 
in which it is shown that (e.g. in the Cournot case) for a given bank ‘I’ the FOC (First 
Order Condition) amounts to Li = αi/ε, where αi is the market share of the bank,  ε is the 
elasticity of demand and Li is the PCM, or Lerner Index, calculated as (P - MC)/P, i.e. 
how far a bank’s price is from its marginal cost. Two different empirical versions of the 
Lerner Index approach are available in the literature, and both can be directly used at 
the bank-level of analysis, since they only need the availability of balance sheet data. 
The basic one is a simple ratio between profits and assets of a single bank, as in the case 
of Aghion et al. (2005) and Nickell (1996).  
However, theoretically, PCM is not a robust competition measure. There is an 
aggregation problem in PCM measure of competition. While aggregating from bank 
level PCM to industry level PCM by weighted average method, where the weight of a 
bank equals its market share in the industry, there are chances of wrong inference of 
competition measure using PCM. An increase in competition reallocates market share 
from inefficient banks to efficient banks. Since efficient banks have a higher PCM than 
inefficient banks, the increase in competition raises the weight in the industry average 
PCM of banks with a high PCM. This can raise the industry average PCM (Wolfram 
(1999). Boone (2004)), which is not correct indication of competition. Amir (2003) shows 
that, under certain conditions, an increase in competition through an increase in the 
number of banks in a market can result in an increasing average PCM. Given certain 
circumstances Stiglitz(1989) shows that profits per unit sales can rise in a recession. 
Thus, even though competition among banks increases during recessions, industry 
PCM also increases. Another potential source of error can be the reallocation effect. As a 
result of fiercer competition, the market share of the more efficient banks increases 
while that for less efficient banks decrease. Thus, the weighted average PCM can 
increase if the increase in the market share of the more efficient banks over-compensates 
the decrease of the respective individual PCMs. Therefore, the Lerner-Index i.e. PCM, is 
at least theoretically, potentially misleading.  
 
2.3  Direct measures of competition 
 
The third approach measures the intensity of competition directly, in the way 
prices or outputs respond to costs. Many recent studies of banking use the so-called H-
statistic based on the Panzar and Rosse (1987) methodology, which proxies the reaction 
of output to input prices. The H-statistic is calculated by summing the estimated 
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elasticities of revenue to factor prices; a value of one indicates perfect competition, a 
value of zero (or less) indicates monopoly and intermediate values indicate the degree 
of monopolistic competition. The index ranges from a high of 1 to a low of 0, with 
higher numbers implying greater market power. The theoretical foundation for direct 
measures is stronger than for structural measures, but direct measures have drawbacks 
too. For example, the H-statistic imposes restrictive assumptions on banks’ cost 
functions. This measure neglects differences among banks like size, product or 
geographic differentiation. Still, this approach is increasingly used in empirical research 
because it measures banks’ behaviour and thus competition directly.  
 
2.4  Boone’s Augmented Relative Profit Difference (ARPD)measures of competition 
 
Boone (2008) proposed a new competition measure termed as Relative Profit 
Differences (RPD). Despite theoretical robustness few studies applied the Boone-
Indicator to real world data to date. The only paper published in a refereed journal, to 
our knowledge, is Bikker and Leuvensteijn (2008). Using data for the Dutch life 
insurance market, they calculate the Boone-Indicator using different approximations of 
the variable costs. The Relative Profit Differences (RPD) measure overcomes the 
problems of heterogeneity, aggregation and attrition that could have arisen in the 
previous sections. Moreover, this variable may be constructed using the same bank-
level data necessary to calculate the PCM, without any additional data requirements. It 
could be the case that more efficient bank would report lower costs (then having a 
higher bank-level PCM) whereas less efficient ones would show higher costs (therefore 
lower bank-level PCM). Given a competition shock in the sector due to a more 
aggressive behaviour of the incumbents (e.g. a lower elasticity of substitution among 
products) with consequent lower prices, less efficient bank would exit and their market 
shares would be redistributed among more efficient ones, hence eventually increasing 
the aggregate PCM. That is a case where a positive competition shock determines a 
higher sector-level PCM, implying that, under particular circumstances, the PCM 
measure is not monotonic in competition. The RPD measure instead increases 
(decreases) not only for the enhanced (lower) competition that arises from lower entry 
barriers, but also for competition that reallocates output to more efficient incumbent 
bank within the sector, thus ensuring the respect of monotonicity with respect to the 
direction of the competition shock.  
 
3. Theoretical perspectives 
The competitiveness index (Augmented Relative Profit Difference) is devised by 
Boone (2008) which is robust as compared to traditional measure of competition. 
Several studies concluded that countries with lesser entry and activity restrictions tend 
to have stronger competition. By contrast, structural variables do not have a significant 
impact on competition, as measured by the H-statistic. Contestability appears to be 
more important than market structure in explaining the strength of competition in 
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banking. Another strand of studies, however, find that bank size matters for market 
power, and in the way predicted by the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
paradigm. Competition is found to decrease significantly with bank size. This may be 
because large banks are in a better position to collude with other banks, or because large 
banks are more likely to operate in product or geographical markets where there are 
few competitors.  
Boone (2008) proposes a new competition measure termed Relative Profit 
Differences (RPD) which is defined as follows. Let π(n) denote the variable profit level 
of a bank with efficiency level n ϵ R+ where higher n denotes higher efficiency. 
Consider three banks with different efficiency levels,        , and calculate the RPD 
as follows. 
 
              
                      
                      
                                                                                     
 
The more intense the competition (brought about by either lower entry costs or 
more aggressive interaction among existing banks) the higher the value of RPD. More 
precisely, a rise in competition reallocates output from less efficient to more efficient 
banks. Since this output reallocation effect is a general feature of more intense 
competition, which is true for the RPD, a robust measure of competition from a 
theoretical point of view. 
When RPD is used as a measure of competition, the following three assumptions 
are always explicitly made as postulated by Boone: 
(i) Efficiency is one dimensional, i.e. banks under consideration act in a market 
with relatively homogeneous goods. If efficiency is, say, two dimensional, an increase in 
competition forces a bank to focus on the activity in which it is most productive. This 
may raise the bank-level price cost margin. If a bank’s efficiency level is not observed, 
an increase in efficiency leads to a higher price cost margin which is then (incorrectly) 
interpreted as reduced competition.  
(ii) a bank’s efficiency level can be observed, i.e. we assume symmetry. Hence, 
banks act on a level playing field that ensures that changes in competition affect banks 
directly and not indirectly through changes in that playing field. It also implies that 
bank i’s profits are the same as bank j’s profits would be if bank j was in bank i’s 
situation. Thus, within the theoretical framework of the indicator, this implies equal 
profit level for two equally efficient companies.  
(iii) banks compete on a level playing field, i.e., we are able to rank banks with 
respect to their efficiency (n).  If banks compete on an uneven playing field, changes in 
competition can affect the status of the level playing field and making it hard to 
interpret both RPD and PCM. 
Given a competition shock in the banking sector due to a more aggressive 
behaviour of the incumbents (e.g. a lower elasticity of substitution among products) 
with consequent lower prices, less efficient bank would exit and their market shares 
would be redistributed among more efficient ones, hence eventually increasing the 
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aggregate PCM. That is a case where a positive competition shock determines a higher 
sector-level PCM, implying that, under particular circumstances, the PCM measure is 
not monotonic in competition. The RPD measure instead increases (decreases) not only 
for the enhanced (lower) competition that arises from lower entry barriers, but also for 
competition that reallocates output to more efficient incumbent bank within the sector, 
thus ensuring the respect of monotonicity with respect to the direction of the 
competition shock.  
The aim of this Section is to introduce a general model with ‘i' banks that can 
enter and compete in a market. Banks are ranked such that lower ‘i’ implies higher 
efficiency: n1≥ n2≥…≥ ni. Each bank ‘i’ choose a vector of strategic variables ai ϵ Rk. This 
choice leads to output vector q(ai; a_i ; θ)  RL+ for bank i, where θ is a parameter that 
affects the aggressiveness of banks conduct in the market. Further, the choices of the 
strategic variables also lead to a vector of prices p(ai; a_i ; θ)  RL+ for bank ‘i’ products. 
Finally, we specify the costs of production for bank i as  [               ] We say that ni
 R+  measures a bank’s efficiency level. 
 
The equilibrium variable profits is defined as follows 
 
                                       [              ]                                                     
 
Thereby the efficiency index N needs to be one dimensional to ensure transitivity. 
Given that the production costs are captured by C(q,n) with as output quantity, the 
relationship between efficiency and cost is assumed to be: 
 
       
   
   
       
  
   
 
  
       
    
  
   
 
for
     1,2,…,L                                                                                                                              ( . ) 
 
The proposition of the first two quotients on the left-hand side is clear-cut. The 
first states that banks have positive marginal costs. The second quotients defines that 
costs are lower the more efficient banks are. Finally, the quotient at the right-hand side 
states that marginal costs are lower for more efficient banks. Given these assumptions, 
banks play a two stage game. In the first stage, they decide whether or not to enter. This 
is determined by the entry costs and the expected profit. Only banks enter that are able 
to recoup entry costs. In the second stage, the remaining banks simultaneously choose 
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their actions to maximize profits. This gives a sub game equilibrium for each 
competitive state. 
Boone uses two parameters to model changes in competition. One is the conduct 
parameter θ, which mirrors the aggressiveness of banks. The second is the change in 
entry costs ε. Then, the output reallocation effect works in the following way:  
 
       
  
 
and 
       
    
  
are increasing in n.                                                                                                                          
 
Given these conditions, while an increase in competition can decrease the output 
of banks, this decrease will be smaller for more efficient banks. As a result the market 
share for the more efficient banks increases while that for the less efficient banks 
shrinks. Hence, competition rewards efficient banks. Given these setting, the RPD is 
calculated as a quotient of profit level differences. 
 
             
                      
                      
 
 
Increasing competition raises this measure for any three banks with         . 
As Boone (2008) proves, his measure of competition is robust to distortions out of the 
reallocation effect.  
However, if there are more than three banks, comparing RPDs over time for each 
company is impractical. One convenient way, proposed by Boone (2008), is to plot the 
RPDs. Using a bank’s normalized efficiency for the x-coordinates gives a function that is 
always bounded at one on both axes. The increase in competition leads to lower bank 
specific RPDs. To measure the change in competition one now calculates and compares 
the area under both curves. Since we have normalized values the area is bounded 
between zero and one, with zero implying perfect competition and one the complete 
absence of competition. The area in our example shrinks and thus correctly indicates 
fiercer competition.  
 
The bank-level measure is constructed as follows: 
 
      
             
              
                                                                                                                             
 
Where     is profit at time t, i is the bank whose RPD is measured and [iL, iU] is the set of 
banks belonging to a given industry and ranked by cost-efficiency, from the less 
efficient iL to the more efficient iU. The inverse of normalized efficiency is 
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One advantage of the RPD measure is that one does not need to observe all banks in an 
industry to calculate it properly, since the result holds for any subset of banks sampled, 
increasing competition would in any case pull down the whole curve. Another 
interesting feature of the RPD measure is that it is also strongly correlated with the 
within effect of the PCM decomposition previously analyzed (Boone et al., 2007). The 
latter allows to further assess the robustness of the within effect as a selection indicator.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
We use annual bank balance sheet and income statement data for the 1996–2011 
period retrieved from the ‘Statistical Table Relating to Banks in India’ published by RBI 
and Prowess Database of CMIE. Our data set covers all the major banks in public sector, 
private sector and foreign sector.  
 
4.1 Relative Profit Difference (RPD) – a non- parametric measure of competition 
 
Using bank level panel data set we test the empirical validity of the Augmented 
RPD measure for competition in Indian loan market. Our analysis reveals that the non-
parametric RPD approach fails to correctly indicate competition. A proposed 
augmented Boone measure based on RPDs performs better. The non-parametric 
Relative Profit Difference (RPD) is defined as follows: 
 
      
             
              
                                                                                                                      
 
Where πt is profit at time t, ‘i’ is the bank whose RPD is measured and [iL, iU] is 
the set of banks belonging to a given industry and ranked by cost-efficiency, from the 
less efficient iL to the more efficient iU. One convenient way, proposed by Boone (2008), 
is to plot the RPDs using a bank’s normalized efficiency and normalized profits on the 
xy-coordinates. The increase in competition leads to lower bank specific RPDs. To 
measure the change in competition one now calculates and compares the area under 
curves. Since we have normalized values the area is bounded between zero and one, 
with zero implying perfect competition and one the complete absence of competition. In 
this case, the more competitive a sector, the more the curved line would be pulled to the 
bottom right. From the graph, the levels of competition within a sector can be computed 
as the area below the RPD curve. The smaller the area below the curve, the higher it is 
the level of competition within a sector.  
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Figure 4.1.Efficiency and RPD 
 
From the above Figure, it is obvious that as the slope of the curve decreases the area 
under the curve will decrease and hence the competition will increase accordingly. 
Using the same intuition an alternative parametric approach of Augmented RPD is 
proposed below. 
 
4.2 Augmented RPD – a parametric measure of competition 
 
Theoretically, the loan market competition increases in two ways. First, 
competition increases when the produced services of various banks become closer 
substitutes and when entry cost decline. Boone et al (2004) prove that market shares of 
more efficient banks, i.e., with lower marginal costs, increase both under stronger 
substitution and amid lower entry costs. So the following relationship between market 
share and marginal cost can be setup (Leuvensteijn, 2007). 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
where the loan market share of bank i, (si)=(loan)i/total loan, and parameter β is the 
Boone measure of competition. The parameter β is expected to be negative because of 
inverse relationship between the market shares of loan of banks and marginal costs. The 
stronger competition is, the stronger this effect will be, and the larger, in absolute terms 
since marginal costs are unobservable, we have to calculate marginal costs from 
Translog Cost Function (TCF) with the linear homogeneity in the input prices and cost 
exhaustion restrictions using individual bank observations. Such a function assumes 
that the technology of an individual bank can be described by one multiproduct 
production function. Under proper conditions, a dual cost function can be derived from 
such a production function, using output levels and factor prices as arguments. A TCF 
is a second-order Taylor expansion around the mean of a generic dual cost function 
with all variables appearing as logarithms. It is a flexible functional form that has 
proven to be an effective tool in explaining multiproduct bank services. The TCF has the 
following form: 
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           ∑    ∑      ∑∑    (    )    ∑∑∑     (    )                                
 
where the dependent variable cit reflects the production costs of bank i(i= 1, .., N ) in 
year t (t =1, .., T ) in di dummy for type category of the bank, that is, public sector banks, 
private sector banks or foreign sector bank. The variable dt is a dummy variable, which 
is 1 in year t and other wise zero. The coefficient γjk indicates general substitution 
parameters between inputs and outputs. The explanatory variables xikt represent three 
groups of variables (k = 1,...,K.). The first group consists of (K1) bank output 
components, such as loans, securities and other services (proxied by other income). The 
second group consists of (K2) input prices, such as wage rates, deposit rates (as price of 
funding) and the price of other expenses (proxied as the ratio of other expenses to fixed 
assets). The third group consists of (K-K1-K2) control variables (also called ‘netputs’), 
e.g. the capital equity ratio. In line with Berger and Mester (1997), the equity ratio 
corrects for differences in loan portfolio risk across banks. The coefficients α, βj, all vary 
with the bank type. The parameters δt  are the coefficients of the time dummies and υit is 
the error term. 
The marginal costs of output category j = l (of loans) for bank ‘i’ of category h 
(say) in year t, mcilt are defined as: 
 
      
     
     
            
         
         
                                                                                                          
 
The term ∂ln(cit)/∂ln(xilt) is the first derivative of above equation of costs to loans. 
This leads to the following equation of the marginal costs for output category loans (l) 
for bank ‘i’  in category h during year t, 
 
                                 ∑                                                                                       
 
Given the estimated marginal costs from the previous section, we are now able to 
estimate the Boone measure. To do so, we use for each bank category the marginal costs 
of individual banks and their market shares and estimate the following equation 
 
          ∑           ∑                                                                                              
 
where ‘s’ stands for market share, mc for marginal costs, i refers to bank i, and t to year 
t; dt are time dummies, and uit is the error term. This provides us with the coefficient  , 
the Boone indicator (BI). Under this static model, it is assumed that markets are always 
in their long-run equilibrium at each time period for which the data are observed, 
yielding statistics that are biased towards zero.  
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5. Empirical Evidence for India 
Reforms were intended to usher in greater efficiency in the Indian banking system. 
Has this purpose been achieved? There are two ways in which this question can be 
looked at. One is to look at accounting measures of efficiency. Another is to look at 
economic measures of efficiency. One strand of literature on efficiency in Indian 
banking attempts to assess whether the segment that was said to be badly wanting in 
efficiency at the commencement of reforms, PSBs, has improved its performance; if this 
has happened, it augurs well for efficiency in the system as a whole.  
 
5.1 Some stylized facts 
We begin by looking at trends in accounting measures of efficiency.  
 
i. Competition  
 
One measure of competition is the share of top five banks in assets, deposits and profits. 
It can be seen that on all three indicators, the share of the top five banks has declined, 
which points to increased competition. 
 
Table 5.1: Share of Top Five Banks - Assets, Deposits and Profits 
Year Assets Deposits Profits 
1991-92 51.70 49.00 54.50 
1998-99 44.70 44.40 49.10 
2001-02 43.50 43.30 41.40 
2007-08 38.40 37.30 37.20 
2010-11 40.79 36.44 36.41 
 
ii. Spread  
 
One measure of spread is the ratio of net interest income (NIM) to total assets. One 
would expect the spread to decline consequent to deregulation. That is what 
deregulation is all about: it squeezes the margins of producers and leads to increase in 
volumes. India’s banking sector has been relatively impervious to this trend. Table 4 
shows the trend in NIM in the period since deregulation. The NIM was surprisingly 
steady from the start of deregulation until 2006-07. For three years thereafter, there was 
promise of a decline in NIM. In 2010-11, however, the NIM rose again and was slightly 
above the level at the start of deregulation. This has, of course, turned out to be a 
blessing for banks but it goes counter to the rationale for deregulation. 
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Table 5.2: Net Interest Income (Spread) to Total Assets(Average) 
Year 
Public 
Sector 
Banks 
Old Private 
Sector Banks 
New Private 
Sector Banks 
Foreign 
Banks in 
India 
Scheduled 
Commercial 
Banks 
1992-95 2.72 3.24 1.17 3.98 2.84 
1999-00 2.70 2.33 1.95 3.92 2.73 
2000-01 2.86 2.51 2.14 3.63 2.85 
2003-04 2.94 2.60 1.98 3.46 2.86 
2004-05 2.92 2.70 2.17 3.33 2.83 
2007-08 2.15 2.43 2.40 3.79 2.35 
2008-09 2.10 2.60 2.80 3.90 2.40 
2009-10 2.29 2.56 3.00 3.96 2.17 
2010-11 2.78 2.95 3.16 3.86 2.92 
 
Efficiency, as measured by net profit to total assets, has shown an unambiguous 
improvement over the years and has touched the important figure of 1% in recent years. 
(Internationally, a 1% return on assets is considered a benchmark for good 
performance). It is striking that, in the years following the sub-prime crisis, said to be 
the worst crisis in the past century, return on assets has remained over 1% in Indian 
banking. This is a measure of how insulated Indian banking is and it is also a measure 
of the steady improvement in fundamentals in the sector. 
 
Table 5.3: Net profit/ total assets (%) 
 
Year 
Public 
Sector 
Bank 
Old Private 
Sector Bank 
New Private 
Sector Bank 
Foreign 
Banks in 
India 
Scheduled 
Commercial 
Bank 
1996-97 0.57 0.91 1.73 1.19 0.67 
1997-98 0.77 0.80 1.55 0.96 0.82 
1998-99 0.42 0.48 1.03 0.69 0.47 
1999-00 0.57 0.81 0.97 1.17 0.66 
2000-01 0.42 0.59 0.81 0.93 0.49 
2002-03 0.96 1.17 0.90 1.56 1.01 
2004-05 0.87 0.33 1.05 1.29 0.89 
2006-07 0.83 0.70 0.91 1.57 0.90 
2008-09 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.70 1.00 
2009-10 0.97 0.95 1.38 1.26 1.05 
2010-11 0.96 1.12 1.51 1.74 1.10 
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iii. Operating Costs 
 
The ratio of operating costs to total assets has declined dramatically in the post-reform 
years, driven largely by the decline in the ration in the PSB group. The most important 
reason is that the workforce remained constant in PSBs through the initial years in the 
face of rising volume of work, followed by a reduction caused by voluntary attrition. It 
is only in three years or so that recruitment has gathered pace in PSBs. Another reason 
is branch rationalization. The hard work of setting up branches had been accomplished 
in the nationalization era, so PSBs found that they did not have to invest in branches 
and could, in fact, afford to close down a few. Thus, efficiency in the system as a whole 
can be said to have improved, using a set of accounting measures. 
 
Table 5.4: Intermediation costs to total assets ratio (per cent) 
 
Year 
Public 
Sector 
Bank 
Old Private 
Sector Bank 
New Private 
Sector Bank 
Foreign 
Banks in 
India 
Scheduled 
Commercial 
Bank 
1996-97 2.88 2.52 1.94 3.00 2.85 
1997-98 2.66 2.31 1.76 2.97 2.63 
1998-99 2.66 2.26 1.74 3.59 2.67 
2004-05 2.09 1.96 2.06 2.88 2.13 
2006-07 1.77 1.85 2.11 2.78 1.91 
2007-08 1.54 1.66 2.28 2.84 1.78 
2008-09 1.50 1.70 2.20 2.80 1.70 
2009-10 1.61 1.88 2.16 2.52 1.78 
2010-11 1.70 1.94 2.23 2.71 1.86 
 
5.2 Non-parametric RPD Estimation 
The non-parametric Relative Profit Difference (RPD) is defined as follows 
 
      
             
              
 
 
Where πt is profit at time t, ‘i’ is the bank whose RPD is measured and [iL, iU] is the set of 
banks belonging to a given industry and ranked by cost-efficiency, from the less 
efficient iL to the more efficient iU. One convenient way, proposed by Boone (2008), is to 
plot the RPDs using a bank’s normalized efficiency and normalized profits on the xy co-
ordinates as given in the above figure. The increase in competition leads to lower bank 
specific RPDs. To measure the change in competition one now calculates and compares 
the area under curves. Since we have normalized values the area is bounded between 
zero and one, with zero implying perfect competition and one the complete absence of 
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competition. In this case, the more competitive a sector, the more the curved line would 
be pulled to the bottom right. From the graph, the levels of competition within a sector 
can be computed as the area below the RPD curve. The smaller the area below the 
curve, the higher is the level of competition within a sector. The non-parametric values 
of RPD were calculated from the dataset and are compared with the two other 
commonly used measures of competition viz., PCM and H-stat, as given in the 
Table.5.6.  
 
Table.5.6: Comparative study of different measures of competition 
 
YEAR 
RPD (Non-parametric) 
 
H-stat PCM 
1996 0.357 0.666 0.514 
1997 0.315 0.734 0.553 
1998 0.347 0.646 0.504 
1999 0.399 0.627 0.463 
2000 0.479 0.633 0.427 
2001 0.392 0.615 0.427 
2002 0.185 0.440 0.344 
2003 0.434 0.466 0.423 
2004 0.513 0.646 0.454 
2005 0.468 0.656 0.467 
2006 0.429 0.458 0.462 
2007 0.521 0.616 0.448 
2008 0.620 0.584 0.397 
2009 0.668 0.492 0.332 
2010 0.691 0.503 0.381 
2011 0.632 0.514 0.402 
 
The results for the traditional Lerner index (PCM) a general decreasing level of 
bank competition up to around 2002 and an increasing level of bank competition 
afterwards. Moreover, the traditional Lerner index indicates a non-consistent trend of 
increase in the competition level for most of the years. Furthermore, the H-statistics is 
significantly different from zero and one for all years, rejecting the null hypothesis that 
India loan markets are in a state of either perfect competition or monopoly. This 
measure performed better than the PCM but not consistent as compared with the RPD 
measure. 
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5.3 Parametric Augmented RPD Estimation 
It is evident from the Table 5.6 that the RPD value over the period is highly 
volatile. This volatility may be assumed to be due to the non-parametric measurement 
technique by using the normalized efficiency and normalized profitability. But this RPD 
measure gives a better idea of the state and process of competitiveness in the loan 
market as compared to the conventional H-statistics and PCM measure. In order to set it 
right, we have used the Augmented Relative Profit Difference (ARPD) measure 
suggested by Leuvensteijn (2008). We have estimated the marginal costs using Translog 
Cost Function. We found that the competition measured by using the ARPD in Table 5.2 
is statistically significant in a consistent manner for all the group of banks. As it is 
known from the theory proposed by Boone (2008), higher the coefficient in absolute 
sense, higher is the competition. In this regard, we conclude that competitiveness in 
private sector banks and public sector banks has decreased as compared to foreign 
banks within the group. Over all the competition in the banking sector increased after 
2002 except a marginal decrease during 2006-07. All the values of the coefficient lie 
between 0 and 1 which indicates the monopolistic nature of competitiveness in the loan 
market in India. The ARPD measure quantifies the impact of marginal costs on 
performance, measured in terms of market shares. Here the original Boone’s RPD is 
improved by calculating marginal costs instead of approximating marginal costs by 
average variable costs.  
 
Table 5.7: The Augmented RPD (ARPD) Measure of Competition 
 
ARPD Measure ALL PSB PVT FRN 
1996 -0.315(0.086)** -0.304(0.084) ** -0.228(0.057) ** -0.338(0.308) 
1997 -0.340(0.087)** -0.329(0.085) ** -0.242(0.058) ** -0.357(0.300) 
1998 -0.356(0.085)** -0.345(0.086) ** -0.227(0.056) ** -0.672(0.341) * 
1999 -0.307(0.086)** -0.296(0.081) ** -0.189(0.057) ** -0.547(0.359) 
2000 -0.384(0.091)** -0.374(0.091) ** -0.235(0.061) ** -0.414(0.348) ** 
2001 -0.359(0.088)** -0.346(0.087) ** -0.223(0.058) ** -0.420(0.395) * 
2002 -0.453(0.091)** -0.442(0.091) ** -0.299(0.059) ** -0.392(0.432) ** 
2003 -0.404(0.086)** -0.395(0.086) ** -0.363(0.057) ** -0.470(0.343) ** 
2004 -0.384(0.080)** -0.376(0.079) ** -0.357(0.054) ** -0.504(0.261) ** 
2005 -0.390(0.067)** -0.432(0.067) ** -0.409(0.046) ** -0.320(0.201) ** 
2006 -0.341(0.061)** -0.433(0.060) ** -0.431(0.041) ** -0.499(0.187) ** 
2007 -0.360(0.051)** -0.543(0.051) ** -0.423(0.034) ** -0.475(0.174) ** 
2008 -0.388(0.061)** -0.513(0.051) ** -0.421(0.042) ** -0.563(0.180) ** 
2009 -0.452(0.050)** -0.603(0.051) ** -0.531(0.033) ** -0.644(0.193) ** 
2010 -0.448(0.059)** -0.572(0.062) ** -0.543(0.032) ** -0.663(0.178) ** 
2011 -0.493(0.063)** -0.656(0.059) ** -0.625(0.034) ** -0.694(0.184) ** 
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It is observed after the banking crises the foreign banks are adversely affected in 
terms of competition as compared to both the public sector and private banks. The 
causes of fluctuations in the competition in the foreign banks are their risk taking 
behavior and global risk exposure. All in all, according to the ARPD measure, 
competitive conditions in the loan markets have increased over the study period and 
the structure loan market in India is monopolistic in nature. On and average the 
competition in loan market has increased. It is evident from the above Table 5.7, the 
level of increase in competitiveness index within public sector bank and private sector 
bank is in similar line but the competitiveness index within private sector banks have 
increased with very rapid pace. The foreign sector banks were comparatively less 
competitive up to 1999 but increased continuously till 2005. The competitiveness index 
of the foreign banks decreased during the onset of crisis period, but after the crisis the 
competition level in the foreign sector banks increased gradually. 
 
6. Key Findings and Conclusions 
 
This study endeavored at measuring bank competition in Indian loan market 
using a new competitiveness index the Augmented Relative Profit Difference (ARPD), 
which quantifies the impact of marginal costs on performance, measured in terms of 
market shares. The original Boone RPD is improved by calculating marginal costs 
instead of approximating marginal costs by average variable costs. The conventional 
measures of competition such as the Lerner index and Panzar-Rosse H-statistic did not 
perform well as compared to those estimated using the Augmented RPD approach. We 
argue that traditional measures of competition fail to measure competition in the Indian 
banking sector properly, and we provide arguments – both theoretically and 
empirically – to support this. 
Using balance sheet information for a large sample of banks operating in India 
during 1996–2011, we show that competition actually increased in the past decade when 
using the ARPD measure introduced by Boone et al. (2007) and Boone (2008) as a 
theoretically robust competitiveness index to measure competition in loan market.  This 
study yields two major insights. First, the theoretical foundation of the ARPD is very 
robust as compared to other conventional measures. This makes the ARPD a much 
better measure to gauge competition in a single sector of an industry, say Indian loan 
markets, than conventional approaches. This is a very general insight that can be useful 
for investigations of competitive conditions in banking markets in a particular sector, 
viz., loan market. Second, applying this unbiased competition indicator to India loan 
markets shows that financial reform indeed has contributed to significant 
improvements in competition. Again, we find contradictory results for the conventional 
measures.  
 As regards, the competition among specific types of banks, we found public 
sector banks and private sector banks are comparatively more competitive than foreign 
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banks. All in all, according to the Augmented RPD measure, competitive conditions in 
the loan markets over time increased and the ARPD values lie between zero and one. 
This finding indicates that the Indian loan markets are monopolistic in nature.  
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